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Preface
The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities is an independent 
study group that the American Institute of Certified Public Ac­
countants established in October 1974 to examine the numerous 
problems and controversies confronting CPAs in their role as inde­
pendent auditors. The commission is issuing this statement to ex­
plain to interested parties the scope and organization of its study.
This statement outlines through a series of questions the issues 
that the commission plans to consider. The commission believes that 
this information should be widely and conveniently available be­
cause the conclusions and recommendations that will emerge will 
have significant implications for both independent auditors and 
those who use the work of independent auditors.
The commission plans to hold public hearings, the scheduling 
of which will be preceded by a formal call for position papers in a 
notice of public hearing that will be distributed with a discussion 
of the issues to be considered. In the meantime, however, individu­
als and organizations are invited to consider the issues as outlined 
in this statement and to submit information relevant to the com­
mission’s consideration of those issues. The commission would wel­
come position papers, research results, or other forms of relevant 
information.
Correspondence on matters discussed in this statement or on 
other aspects of the commission’s work should be sent to
Douglas R. Carmichael
The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
M a n u e l  F. C o h e n , Chairman
September 1975
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General Background and 
Organization of the Study
Introduction
The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities will study the 
role of independent auditors in society to identify auditors’ responsi­
bilities in relation to the needs and reasonable expectations of users 
of financial statements and to recommend actions that the profes­
sion should take to assure that independent auditors discharge those 
responsibilities adequately.
The commission is similar to two other independent study 
groups sponsored by the AICPA, but its work should be distin­
guished from the work of those two groups. A seven-man group was 
appointed in 1971 to study the process of establishing accounting 
principles and to make recommendations for improving that proc­
ess. The report of that group (Study Group on the Establishment of 
Accounting Principles), which was published in 1972, resulted in 
the formation of the Financial Accounting Standards Board. A 
group to study the objectives of financial statements (Study Group 
on the Objectives of Financial Statements), also appointed in 1971, 
published its report on those objectives in 1973. Both groups were 
concerned with accounting principles and financial reporting objec­
tives, matters that relate to the determination of the reporting and 
disclosure requirements for financial statements, whereas the com­
mission is concerned with matters that relate to the role and respon­
sibilities of independent auditors in examining and reporting on 
financial statements and other information.
Although accounting and auditing are closely related, inter­
dependent disciplines, their objectives differ. Accounting is con­
cerned with measuring and reporting the effects of the economic ac­
tivity of individual enterprises. Auditing, on the other hand, involves 
an independent examination to determine the propriety of account­
ing measurements and communications. The distinction between 
accounting and auditing, however, cannot always be clearly drawn 
because the auditor must consider the appropriateness of accounting 
measurements and presentations.
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Organization of the Commission
The members of the commission were chosen to provide con­
tributions from a wide variety of backgrounds and experience. A 
majority of the members are not professional auditors. T he chairman 
of the commission, Manuel F. Cohen, is a securities lawyer and a 
former chairman of the United States Securities and Exchange Com­
mission. W alter S. Holmes, Jr., a nonpracticing CPA, is chairman 
of the board and chief executive officer of a large finance-based di­
versified company. William C. Norby, a chartered financial analyst 
and senior vice president of a Chicago-based firm of professional in­
vestment advisors, is a former president of the Financial Analysts 
Federation. Lee J. Seidler, also a nonpracticing CPA, is a professor 
of accounting and a business analyst and consultant. Three mem­
bers, forming a minority in the commission, are professional audi­
tors. LeRoy Layton, who recently retired as the managing partner of 
an international CPA firm, is a former president of the American In­
stitute of CPAs and a former chairman of the Accounting Principles 
Board. Kenneth W. Stringer is the senior technical partner in an 
international CPA firm. John J. van Benten is the managing part­
ner of a midwestern regional CPA firm.
The staff of the commission is under the direction of Douglas 
R. Carmichael, director of the Institute's auditing standards divi­
sion. The staff includes Paul Rosenfield, director of the Institute’s 
technical research division, and Thomas W. McRae and Brian Zell, 
also of the Institute’s technical research division. Henry R. Jaenicke, 
a professor of business administration and chairman of the depart­
ment at Franklin and Marshall College, is the principal research 
consultant for the commission. In addition, the commission has en­
gaged outside consultants from the academic community and from 
the accounting and legal professions to conduct special research 
projects. They include two accounting professors, Lewis Davidson 
(University of North Carolina) and John Grant Rhode (University 
of California at Berkeley) and a partner in a major CPA firm, Rob­
ert K. Mautz, who joined that firm after a distinguished career as 
an academician.
Scope and Organization of Study
The commission plans to consider how well independent audi­
tors are meeting their present responsibilities, whether their respon­
sibilities should be changed, and how the nature and limitations of 
those responsibilities can best be communicated to users of the audi­
tors’ work.
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The commission has decided to take a comprehensive view of 
the problem with which it was presented. To facilitate analysis, the 
total problem has been divided into “Phases” and “Issues.” Many 
of the different issues dealt with clearly are closely interrelated; how­
ever, the initial work of the commission has indicated that the outline 
presented here provides a useful and workable framework for the 
project. The final report or reports of the commission may not fol­
low this format precisely, if subsequent research, consideration, or 
other developments suggest a more effective classification.
The members of the commission recognize the ambitious scope 
of the project presented here. As the work of the commission pro­
gresses, constraints on time and resources may suggest elimination 
of some of the issues. The commission may conclude on some issues 
that the answers can be provided better by other bodies. Neverthe­
less, the commission believes that the total problem should be ini­
tially considered on as broad a basis as possible. The scope of the 
project will be narrowed, if necessary, only after the commission 
has considered all of the issues identified.
The term “issues” has been applied to the sixteen major seg­
ments of the project. However, the use of that word does not neces­
sarily imply that a controversy exists in each area identified as an 
issue.
The issues have been delineated in this statement largely in 
terms of a series of questions. Many of the questions emphasize pos­
sible changes in existing practices, relationships, structures, and so 
forth. T hat approach should not be construed to imply that the 
members of the commission have prejudged the need or desirability 
of change in any of the areas under consideration. To the contrary, 
the first stage in the commission’s analysis is an examination and 
evaluation of current conditions and practices. T hat initial step 
should therefore be considered as an implicit starting point in the 
consideration of all the issues.
The first two issues, (1) the role of the independent auditor 
and (2) the gap between performance and expectations, are funda­
mental and relate to the overall objectives of the study. Many of the 
factors outlined under those two issues will pervade the study, and 
their resolution will provide a general frame of reference.
The resolution of many issues in the project will inevitably 
depend on some fundamental value judgments about the role of the 
auditor and the needs and expectations of users of the work of inde­
pendent auditors. Also, changes in auditors’ responsibilities will un­
doubtedly involve some changes in the costs and benefits of the audit 
function. Although precise measurements of costs and benefits are 
unattainable, the commission will consider the means of measuring
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and balancing the costs and benefits of changes in the audit function 
in its study of each issue.
The commission divided the issues into the following three 
phases: phase I includes issues that relate primarily to a clarification 
and amplification of the independent auditor’s present responsibili­
ties; phase II includes issues that are involved with the extension of 
the auditor’s role to activities and responsibilities that have not tra­
ditionally been considered to be encompassed in his role; phase III 
includes those issues that relate primarily to the institutional frame­
work of the audit function and possible changes in that framework.
Thus, the issues identified in this statement are presented and 
outlined under the following headings:
1. General Issues (2 issues).
2. Phase I: The Auditor’s Present Responsibilities (6 issues).
3. Phase II: Extension of the Auditor’s Role (2 issues).
4. Phase III: The Institutional Framework of the Audit Func­
tion (6 issues).
Progress to Date
The full commission has been meeting for two to three days 
each month since November 1974. Meetings are generally held in 
New York. The commission has met twice in Washington, D.C., in 
order to develop and maintain a close liaison with government regu­
latory agencies concerned with auditing.
The commission has invited and met with a num ber of con­
cerned, well-informed individuals who have given the members the 
benefit of their views of the study and the manner in which it should 
be conducted. Those individuals were selected from virtually all 
groups in the United States having a significant interest in the 
auditing function. The commission also met with similarly situated 
members of the Canadian financial community in Toronto, under 
the auspices of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants and 
was given the benefit of their views.
Much of the commission’s time to date has been spent on the 
development, refinement, and initial consideration of this statement. 
Development of background information, surveys of existing litera­
ture, and other research work have been completed on the topics 
in Phase I, and the staff and members of the commission are in the 
process of developing preliminary positions on several of the issues. 
A series of research projects has been commissioned from a num ber 
of outside researchers, and several noted individuals have been in­
vited to submit papers on specific topics.
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Public Hearings
The commission plans to conduct one or more public hearings 
in the spring of 1976. All individuals and groups interested in or 
concerned with the work of independent auditors will be afforded 
an opportunity to present their views to the commission. Before a 
public hearing is scheduled, the commission will distribute a notice 
of hearing with a call for position papers and a discussion document 
on the issues to be considered. T hat document, which the commis­
sion plans to distribute in the fall of 1975, will contain a discussion 
of many of the questions outlined in this statement and tentative 
conclusions on some of those questions.
In  scheduling the public hearings, the commission plans to af­
ford those desiring to submit position papers sufficient time for 
preparation after the notice of hearing and the discussion document 
have been distributed. However, this statement provides a basis 
for an earlier consideration of the issues, and the commission encour­
ages those who are interested in its work to consider this document 
carefully. The commission would welcome the submission of posi­
tion papers, research results, or other forms of information relevant 
to its study before the formal call for position papers.
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General Issues
The two general issues outlined in this section are funda­
mental to the study, and the relevant aspects of each will be con­
sidered throughout the study.
G-1. The Role of the Independent Auditor
This issue concerns the development of a conceptual foundation for 
defining the role of the independent auditor in society as a necessary 
basis for delineating his responsibilities.
The commission will consider the role of the independent 
auditor in the American economy and, as a framework for its con­
siderations of other issues in the study, will develop a statement of 
the functions that independent auditors should perform. Aspects of 
that statement will include specifications of the users of auditors’ 
work, the beneficiaries of the audit function, and the appropriate 
relationship between information and the audit function.
Before it is completed, the initial statement on this fundamental 
issue will be tested against conclusions on the other issues.
A. W hat economic and social purposes does auditing serve?
1. W hat segments of society need audits? For what purposes?
2. In what ways does the independent auditor affect the credi­
bility, quality, quantity, or other characteristics of the infor­
mation with which he becomes associated in a public report?
3. In what ways does auditing affect the process of resource 
allocation in the economy?
B. W hat is or should be the relationship between the types of 
information reported on and the auditor’s role? Should the role 
be defined in terms of the specific types of information reported 
on or more broadly? (The auditor’s role in the financial re­
porting process has been largely confined to an expression of 
an opinion on quantitative information—for the most part, an­
nual financial statements.)
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C. W hat factors in the economic and social environment help to 
define and lim it the role of the auditor?
1. T o what extent are the boundaries fixed by the apparent 
competence of auditors?
2. W hat are the sources (legal, moral, social) of the auditor’s 
authority and responsibilities?
a. W hat events, conditions, or relationships trigger those 
responsibilities?
b. To whom do those responsibilities run?
3. W hat is the impact of the close relationship between ac­
counting and auditing?
D. To what extent can the economic and social purposes of audit­
ing be expressed in terms of measurable benefits that can be 
offset against related measurable costs? T o whom should the 
costs and benefits of auditing run?
G-2. Gap Between Performance and Expectations
This issue concerns the apparent gap between the performance of 
independent auditors and the needs and expectations of users of the 
work of independent auditors.
The needs and expectations of those who use and rely on audi­
tors’ work affect virtually all the major issues. Recommendations 
on the responsibilities of independent auditors must be based on a 
reasonable evaluation of differences between the attained level of 
performance of independent auditors and the level of performance 
expected by users of their work. A gap between performance and 
expectations may be caused in part by substandard performance 
under present responsibilities, in part by users’ reasonable expecta­
tions that auditors accept additional responsibilities, and in part by 
users’ unreasonable expectations.
A. Can the evident gap between performance and expectations be 
attributed in part to substandard performance under present 
responsibilities?
1. Does the available evidence indicate that substandard per­
formance is a serious problem?
2. W hat are the major factors contributing to substandard 
performance?
a. The quality of professional training?
b. The quality of professional standards?
c. The enforcement of professional standards?
d. Other factors?
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3. W hat steps can the profession take to more effectively curb 
substandard performance?
B. Can the gap be attributed in part to identifiable factors that in­
fluence auditors not to accept additional responsibilities that 
they might reasonably assume?
1. Does the available evidence indicate that there are serious 
constraints on the expansion of auditors’ responsibilities?
2. W hat are the major factors contributing to such constraints?
a. The nature of auditing and accounting standards?
b. The methods of establishing those standards?
c. The legal environment?
d. Conflicting responsibilities?
e. The training and behavioral characteristics of auditors?
3. W hat steps could be taken to reduce the negative effect of 
those constraints or factors?
C. Can the performance gap be attributed in part to users’ mis­
understandings with respect to
1. The meaning of auditors’ reports?
2. The inherent limitations of historical information presented 
in financial statements?
3. The limitations of financial statements attributable to the 
necessity of measurement conventions?
4. The limitations inherent in the economic environment, such 
as the impact of uncertainties on financial statements?
5. The limitations of auditing methods with respect to reli­
ance on
a. Testing rather than complete examination?
b. Persuasive rather than conclusive evidence?
c. Judgmental factors and past experience?
6. The limitations placed on the auditor’s authority, concern, 
and work by current conventions, such as
a. The auditor’s concern with the information presented 
rather than the soundness of investing in a company?
b. The limitations of historical information as a basis for 
users’ projections and decision-making and other pur­
poses?
c. Management control over much of the information on 
which the auditor must rely?
d. The nature, extent, and effect of the auditor’s obligation 
to maintain a confidential relationship with his client?
D. W hat steps can be taken to narrow the evident gap?
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Phase Is The Auditor’s 
Present Responsibilities
Phase I of the study is concerned with the responsibilities that an 
independent auditor should assume in an audit of a company’s an­
nual financial statements: responsibilities that laws, regulations, and 
the profession’s self-regulatory process impose on the auditor and 
responsibilities that users of audited financial statements need and 
reasonably expect the auditor to fulfill. The following issues are of 
primary concern in this phase of the study.
Forming an opinion on financial presentations 
Clarifying responsibility for the detection of fraud 
Reporting on uncertainties
Detecting and disclosing adverse management behavior 
Improving communication in the auditor’s standard report 
Improving auditing methods and techniques
The commission hopes to make useful recommendations on 
these issues. Because questions that relate to the independent audi­
tor’s association with annual financial statements are broader than 
the specific issues to be considered in this phase of the study, aspects 
of other interrelated issues will also be considered.
I-1. Forming an Opinion on Financial Presentations
This issue concerns the auditor's responsibility in judging presenta­
tions in financial statements and the role of “generally accepted ac­
counting principles” (GAAP) in that judgment process.
The auditor’s opinion that financial statements “present fairly 
. . . in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles” 
expresses his judgment about those statements. Questions have been 
raised about the nature of both the judgments made and the respon­
sibilities assumed.
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A. W hat elements of judgment are or should be involved in the 
auditor’s formulation of an opinion on financial statements?
1. W hat judgments about the presentation in a company’s 
financial statements does or should an auditor make?
2. To what extent does or should GAAP require explicitly or 
implicitly specific elements of judgment?
3. To what extent and in what ways are the judgments re­
quired of the auditor different from those required of 
management?
4. Is there a set of criteria outside of GAAP that can or should 
be applied by the auditor? For example, to what extent can 
or should the objectives of financial statements provide cri­
teria that would guide or lim it the auditor’s exercise of 
personal judgment?
B. In what ways does the auditor’s conception of the breadth and 
specificity of GAAP help to determine the nature of the audi­
tor’s judgment?
1. Should GAAP be broadly construed to include all elements 
of the decision process necessary to determine appropriate 
application in particular circumstances?
2. Is a more detailed specification of GAAP necessary or de­
sirable?
3. Should distinctions be made in the auditor’s responsibility 
depending on the state of development of accounting prin­
ciples? For example, should the auditor have more respon­
sibility when the circumstances have not been specified for 
the appropriate application of accounting principles?
C. To what extent and in what ways should the auditor’s responsi­
bility for the selection of accounting principles be modified or 
clarified? W hat would be the effects of requiring auditors to 
become more involved in the original selection and application 
of accounting principles as opposed to appraising management’s 
selection and application? W hat would be the effect on
1. The auditor’s independence?
2. Management’s sense of responsibility for the statements?
3. The auditor’s sense of personal responsibility?
I-2. Clarifying the Responsibility for Detection of Fraud
This issue concerns the responsibility for the detection of fraud that 
an independent auditor should assume in an examination of finan­
cial statements.
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Both auditors and users of financial statements have a general 
impression that auditors have certain responsibilities for the detec­
tion of fraud, but the extent of those responsibilities is unclear.
Developing an acceptable definition of fraud is an essential first 
step in considering the auditor’s responsibility with respect to detec­
tion of fraud. In the context of this discussion, “fraud” is tentatively 
defined as intentional misrepresentation of facts undertaken to mis­
lead auditors or users of financial statements, the misappropriation 
or misuse of assets, sometimes referred to as defalcations, and other 
similar irregularities. The tentative definition is more restrictive 
than the legal definition of fraud.
A. To what extent can or should the independent auditor’s un­
qualified opinion be interpreted as representing that the finan­
cial statements are not materially distorted by undetected fraud?
1. Can or should the representation be construed as an abso­
lute guarantee or as only an expression of a degree of ra­
tional belief as to a level of probability of the absence of 
undetected fraud?
2. In what ways does or should the auditor’s representation 
differ for
a. Different types of fraud? For example, should new or 
unique types of fraud be excluded?
b. Very material frauds with pervasive effects on the 
financial statements as contrasted with lesser frauds with 
isolatable effects?
3. W hat other considerations are appropriate to the determi­
nation of the extent to which users are or should be entitled 
to rely on the representation as a protection against the risk 
of unexpected losses from undetected fraud?
B. W hat factors are relevant in considering possible approaches for 
specifying, in a manner that is consistent with the needs and 
reasonable expectations of users, the auditor’s responsibility for 
the detection of fraud and for amplifying and interpreting pro­
fessional standards to provide guidance to individual auditors? 
W hat are the possibilities, problems, and implications of spe­
cifying the auditor’s responsibility on the basis of
1. A classification of frauds according to the extent to which 
an ordinary examination in accordance with professional 
standards should detect them?
a. Specifying, as a part of its professional standards, objec­
tive criteria identifying those types of frauds that an 
ordinary examination should detect, based on the char-
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acteristics of the types of fraud identified? (Some charac­
teristics that have been suggested as possible criteria are 
(1) materiality, (2) relationship to internal control, 
(3) influence on the financial statements, (4) extent 
of concealment, and (5) level of management involved.)
b. A classification of types of frauds in accordance with 
their likelihood of detection by relating their character­
istics to the availability of audit evidence?
2. A specification, as a part of professional standards, of a gen­
eral standard of care that the auditor should exercise in an 
ordinary examination that could serve as a criterion for 
judging responsibility for detecting fraud? W hat should such 
a standard specify with respect to
a. The assumptions that the auditor should make in ap­
proaching the examination, such as his attitude about 
the integrity of company management and personnel?
b. The circumstances and conditions that should arouse his 
suspicions (raise a “red flag”) ?
c. The assumptions that, in the absence of suspicious cir­
cumstances, the auditor should make about the possi­
bility of collusion, unrecorded transactions, or forgery?
d. The level of attention that, from a cost-benefit view­
point, the auditor should give to sources of possible mis­
statements in the financial statements, including not 
only fraud but also other possible sources such as (1) 
clerical errors, (2) inappropriate selection of accounting 
principles, (3) inadequate disclosure, and (4) failure to 
reasonably estimate the outcome of future events?
I-3. Reporting on Uncertainties
This issue concerns the auditor’s role in evaluating the effects on 
financial statements—including the adequacy of disclosure— of un­
certainties concerning the outcome of future events.
The preparation of financial statements requires many estimates 
of the outcome of future events. W hat is the auditor’s responsibility 
for the adequacy of disclosures with respect to uncertainties affecting 
financial information? Can auditors do more to enable users of their 
reports to assess the potential effect of uncertainties? Questions have 
also been raised concerning the auditor’s responsibility with respect 
to unusual uncertainties (for example, significant pending litigation, 
collection of a material receivable from a major customer in finan­
cial difficulty, or the future success of a new major product) the 
probable effects of which are not reasonably determinable at the
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time the financial statements are released and, in management’s 
judgment, are not susceptible to reasonable estimation.
A. What is or should be the auditor’s responsibility to predict the 
outcome, or to evaluate management’s predictions of the out­
come, of future events whose effects are estimated and reflected 
in the financial statements?
1. W hat is the responsibility of the auditor with respect to un­
certainties that effect the measurement or valuation of spe­
cific items in financial statements?
2. How is the auditor’s responsibility affected by the source 
(for example, management, outside experts, historical guide­
lines) of the prediction that the auditor is evaluating?
3. How should the auditor’s responsibility for estimates involv­
ing matters generally considered to be within his traditional 
area of expertise differ from his responsibility for estimates 
involving matters generally considered to be outside of his 
traditional area of expertise?
4. How can present audit techniques for assessing uncertain­
ties be evaluated? W hat role do or should probabilities play?
B. W hat is or should be the auditor’s responsibility for assessing 
the outcome of future events whose effects are not susceptible to 
reasonable estimation? To what extent and in what ways should 
the auditor
1. Assess the adequacy of disclosure of the potential effect of 
the unresolved events on the financial statements?
2. Call attention in his report to the potential effect of the un­
certainty on the financial statements?
3. Disclose in his report his prediction of the outcome of future 
events by giving a quantitative or qualitative indication of 
the likelihood of the future events?
4. Be required to qualify his opinion in light of unusual un­
certainties? W hat are the implications of such requirements 
for an unqualified opinion?
5. W ithhold an opinion on the financial statements if his own 
prediction of the outcome of the future event indicates a 
strong likelihood of unfavorable resolution? How likely 
should the unfavorable outcome be?
6. Be responsible for assessing unusual uncertainties if they 
concern the ability of the company to continue operations?
C. W hat factors should be considered in defining and limiting the 
auditor’s responsibility for reporting on uncertainties? For ex­
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ample, to what extent and in what ways should the considera­
tions recognize the capability of the auditor in predicting the 
outcome of future events as contrasted with the capability of 
users?
D. W ould fundamental changes in the methods of presenting finan­
cial information in financial statements or disclosing uncertain­
ties in financial statements be a more appropriate means of 
communicating the potential effect of uncertainties to users of 
financial statements? (For example, the Report of the Study 
Group on the Objectives of Financal Statements, commonly 
called the Trueblood Report, recommends a num ber of changes 
in financial statements that would improve the disclosure of 
uncertainties. T hat study group recommended distinguishing 
information that is primarily factual from information that is 
primarily interpretive, disclosing basic assumptions underlying 
matters subject to prediction or estimation, and recognizing 
varying degrees of uncertainty by segregating and reporting 
separately, and in greater detail, information on the eventual 
realization of assets and satisfaction of liabilities.) Those 
changes would require a change in existing generally accepted 
accounting principles. W hat effect would those changes, if 
adopted, have on the auditor’s responsibility?
I-4. Detecting and Disclosing Adverse Management 
Behavior
This issue concerns the responsibility of the auditor for detecting 
adverse management behavior and for disclosing known adverse 
behavior to interested parties.
Questions have been raised concerning the auditor’s responsi­
bility to detect and report on management’s failure to comply with 
laws and regulations or other management actions that are disap­
proved by society for moral, public policy, or other reasons. Different 
considerations may a pply to questions concerning the obligation to 
detect and those concerning the obligation to disclose. A funda­
mental question is, Does the auditor’s education, training, and expe­
rience equip him to deal reasonably in the often-involved complexi­
ties of legal and ethical conduct? The other questions in this section 
cannot be answered without reference to this fundamental question.
A. T o  what extent should the auditor in an ordinary examination 
be expected to detect adverse management behavior that does 
not have a material effect on the financial statements?
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B. W hat types of management actions should an auditor be ex­
pected to report? Should the actions include those involving
1. Conflicts of interest?
2. Damage to the environment?
3. Political contributions?
4. Improper or questionable insider transactions?
5. Improper or questionable transactions with related parties?
6. Other violations of laws and regulations, for example
a. Bribery of public officials?
b. Laws prohibiting immoral conduct?
C. To whom should the auditor be expected to report adverse 
management behavior that comes to his attention?
1. Should the auditor be expected to report the matter
a. T o a level of management above that directly involved 
with the behavior?
b. To the board of directors?
c. To the shareholders?
d. T o  the appropriate government regulatory agency? (For 
example, should knowledge of violation of rules involv­
ing insider transactions be reported to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission?)
e. T o  a particular interested party? (For example, should 
violations of a labor contract be reported to union 
leaders?)
2. If the board of directors refuses to take action on a matter 
reported to it and the auditor resigns, should the auditor re­
port the matter to the shareholders or to the general public?
3. Should the auditor require that the matter be disclosed in 
the financial statements?
4. Should the auditor be required to disclose the matter in his 
report?
D. W hat considerations should affect the auditor’s decision whether 
or not to report the matter?
1. Should the prevailing moral climate in the industry or com­
munity affect reporting? (For example, if all businesses in a 
particular industry are expected to make payments to pub­
lic officials as a condition of doing business, does that indi­
cate that the auditor should accept the payments as costs of 
doing business?)
2. Should the relationship of the adverse behavior to the opera­
tions of the business affect reporting? (For example, is mis­
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use of company property different from bribery of public 
officials or adultery?)
3. If the matter has been rectified by discharging the person in 
question or other action deemed appropriate by the board 
of directors or top management, or by modifying the condi­
tions that permitted the behavior, should the matter be 
reported?
I-5. Improving Communication in the Auditor s Standard 
Report
This issue concerns the role of the auditor's report in communicat­
ing with users of financial information and possibilities for improv­
ing communication.
Some observers have suggested that the expectations of users of 
audit reports may exceed the performance of auditors, in part, be­
cause the auditor’s standard report on financial statements fails to 
communicate adequately the degree of responsibility that the audi­
tor intends to assume.
A. Is the auditor’s report an appropriate vehicle for improving the 
understanding of the audit function?
1. Is the wording of the report more or less important than the 
general understanding in the financial community of the 
function performed by auditors when they are associated 
with financial information?
2. To what extent do users of audited financial information 
rely on the report for an understanding of the responsibility 
that the auditor assumes? To what extent do they base their 
understanding on other considerations?
B. W hat are the implications of the association of the auditor with 
financial information without regard to the wording of the re­
port? Do those implications suggest that the auditor should not 
be associated in some circumstances no matter how clear are his 
report and the financial statements?
C. W hat changes in the wording of the report are necessary or de­
sirable to improve communications? Should the report
1. Avoid technical terms and use commonly understood words 
to explain the auditor’s responsibility? (This would prob­
ably result in a much more lengthy report.)
2. Explain more fully the nature of the auditor’s examination, 
including a fuller explanation of the limitations of an audit?
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3. Include an explanation of the division of responsibility 
for financial statements between the independent auditor 
and the management of the company?
4. Include an explanation of the limitations of accounting in­
formation, financial statements, and generally accepted ac­
counting principles?
5. Use varied wording rather than one standard form?
D. W hat other methods could independent auditors use to im­
prove the public’s understanding of the audit function?
I-6. Improving Auditing Methods and Techniques
This issue pertains to the possibilities for improving the effectiveness 
of auditing methods and techniques.
The independent auditor’s ability to obtain sufficient evidential 
matter to support his opinion on financial statements is affected by 
the nature and availability of audit evidence and the effectiveness of 
the methods the auditor uses to obtain it. The objectives in con­
sidering this issue are to determine what improvements, if any, 
should be made in the ways that auditors gather evidence, in what 
ways the availability of reliable evidence to the auditor can be in­
creased, and what should be the relationship of the independent 
auditor to others involved with developing or interpreting financial 
information.
A. Have failures by independent auditors to detect material mis­
statements in financial statements indicated a pattern of major 
weaknesses in auditing methods? Do failures suggest
1. Inadequate knowledge of the company or industry?
2. Poor audit planning?
3. Proper planning but poor execution?
4. Inadequate supervision on audit engagements and, if so, at 
what level?
5. The need for improvements in procedures in particular 
areas of the audit (for example, procedures for payables) ?
B. Do independent auditors need increased authority to obtain 
more reliable evidence?
1. Should actions be taken to increase the auditor’s access to 
information that management may be concealing? For ex­
ample, should penalties be imposed for lying to auditors?
2. Do auditors have ready access to all information within a
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client’s organization? For example, are internal budgets 
available to auditors?
3. Do auditors need increased authority to gain access to in­
formation from parties outside the audited entity?
C. In what ways might the technical guidance on auditing pro­
cedures be usefully expanded?
1. To include numerous examples of circumstances that should 
cause the auditor to exercise more caution or extend his 
procedures?
2. To increase the number of required audit procedures and 
the extent of audit work required? (For example, confirma­
tion of receivables and observation of inventory taking are 
required audit procedures. Should other procedures be simi­
larly required?)
3. To communicate on a current basis the methods that are 
being used to deceive auditors?
D. W hat should be the nature of the relationship between inde­
pendent auditors and other professionals who in some cases 
might be involved with financial information? (For example, 
lawyers, actuaries, and engineers are sometimes involved in the 
measurement of amounts or the preparation of disclosures for 
financial statements.) Should the auditor ever divide his respon­
sibility for an opinion on financial statements with other pro­
fessionals?
E. Are changes needed in the relationship between independent 
auditors who report on the consolidated financial statements of 
an entity (commonly called “principal auditors”) and the inde­
pendent auditors of subsidiaries or divisions?
1. Do principal auditors need increased authority and latitude 
in determining what portion of the total entity they must 
audit?
2. Is this latitude or authority necessary in all circumstances or 
only for some types of entities or entities that engage in cer­
tain types of transactions?
F. W hat effect would various expansions of the auditor’s respon­
sibility have on auditing methods? (For example, if the audi­
tor assumed more explicit responsibility for detecting deliberate 
distortion of financial statements by management, what would 
be the effect on audit procedures and on the general cost and 
effectiveness of audits?)
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Phase II: Extension of the 
Auditor’s Role
Phase II, extension of the auditor’s role, will focus on changes that 
have been proposed concerning new types of financial information 
with which an auditor might be associated, other activities not in­
volving financial information that might be encompassed by the 
audit function, and the relationship of nonauditing services to the 
audit function. The following issues are of primary concern in this 
phase of the study.
New forms of reporting
Evaluating the relationship of nonauditing services to the 
audit function
The resolution of the issues in this phase will depend signifi­
cantly on the conclusions reached on the issues in the first phase 
of the study.
II-1. New Forms of Reporting
This issue concerns the possibility of extending the auditor's role in 
reporting on new forms of information and on other activities and 
characteristics.
The function of independent auditors has traditionally been 
to examine and report on a company’s annual financial statements. 
However, suggestions are now being made that independent auditors 
extend their function to other forms of financial information, to 
nonfinancial information, or to activities or subjects not involving 
information, such as the adequacy of internal control systems or 
the efficiency of certain operations.
Suggestions have been made that independent auditors expand 
their function to include examining and reporting on the following 
forms of information:
1. Interim  financial statements, which are usually issued quar­
terly by publicly traded companies.
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2. Financial information in annual reports other than finan­
cial statements, such as historical financial summaries, sales 
backlog data, graph presentations, and explanations of 
changes in results.
3. Forecasts of operating results or cash flows.
4. Financial information in press releases.
5. Financial statements not required to be audited, released 
annually or on an interim basis.
6. Nonfinancial information in an annual report, such as the 
president’s letter, or descriptions of the qualifications of 
management.
7. Data on a company’s contributions to society and the costs 
to society of its operations in an annual report or a separate 
release.
Cost-benefit considerations that are particularly important in 
considering possible extensions of the auditor’s role include these:
1. The potential consequences of inherent differences in the 
reliability of other forms of information as contrasted with 
traditional financial statements.
2. The potential effectiveness of audits in increasing the reli­
ability of information.
3. The possibility of unwarranted reliance on the information.
4. The costs of having the information audited.
5. The potential delays in distribution.
6. The possible effects on the primary audit function.
7. The cost and benefits of institutional changes that may be 
necessary to implement the auditor’s association with par­
ticular information.
Three aspects of this issue are outlined separately under the 
headings: General Forms of Association, The Auditor-of-Record 
Concept, and Reporting on Other Activities and Characteristics.
II-1a. General Forms of Association. The following are possible 
forms of association.
1. Audit—a form of association involving full use of available 
evidence-gathering methods, including the development of 
professional standards for gathering evidence and for the 
presentation of the information, and the issuance of a re­
port expressing the auditor’s conclusions on the conformity 
of the information with the standards.
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2. Consultation—a form of association in which management 
or the board of directors would select matters involving 
presentation of information on which to seek advice from 
the auditor. The auditor would not issue a report or take 
other action unless he took exception to the presentation.
3. Review—a form of association involving less than an audit 
and more than a consultation. The auditor would select the 
matters to be reviewed and the procedures to be used and 
a report might be issued.
A. Which of the forms of association identified would be worth­
while for each of the types of information identified? W hat pri­
ority should be assigned?
B. Is it possible to establish criteria for the involvement of audi­
tors with various types of information?
1. To what extent should association with information depend 
on the development of relatively objective measurement 
standards?
2. T o  what extent should limits be placed on the auditor’s 
association with information, based on
a. Some scale of the relative amount of uncertainty of such 
information?
b. The availability of evidence to support that informa­
tion?
3. T o  what extent should the auditor’s involvement require 
the use of the full extent of available evidence-gathering 
methods? (For example, a review less extensive than an audit 
might be more desirable for quarterly financial statements.)
4. Under what circumstances would association on a basis in­
volving consideration of only some aspects of information 
be desirable? (For example, a review of a forecast might re­
late only to compilation and the accounting principles ap­
plied, not to the assumptions.)
C. How important, in terms of increasing credibility, is an ex­
plicit report on the information with which the auditor is 
associated?
1. In what circumstances would a report be necessary?
2. Can the auditor explain adequately in a report the distinc­
tions in the extent of responsibility assumed?
a. Can users be expected to understand limitations on re­
sponsibility based on the nature of the information, for 
example, the inherent uncertainty of a forecast?
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b. Can users be expected to understand limitations based 
on the extent of work performed?
II-1b. The Auditor-of-Record Concept. The Securities and Ex­
change Commission has suggested the “auditor-of-record” concept as 
a particular form of involvement with many types of information. 
The concept describes the role of the independent auditor of an 
issuer of financial information whose securities are publicly traded. 
An auditor-of-record would have a continuing responsibility to as­
sess the client’s accounting decisions on a timely basis and review 
all public reports prior to issuance in accordance with a reasonable 
set of standards developed by either the public accounting profes­
sion or the SEC. Acceptance of an engagement to audit annual state­
ments would mean automatic acceptance of the responsibility im­
plicit in the concept.
A. Is the auditor-of-record concept a better approach to extending 
the auditor’s role than consideration of each type of informa­
tion individually?
B. If the auditor-of-record concept were adopted, should it involve 
an explicit reporting requirement or does the SEC’s view, re­
quiring no reporting unless the auditor takes exception to in­
formation, seem better?
C. Should the standards for the presentation of information or the 
scope of the auditor’s review be set by the SEC or the public 
accounting profession, or should the question of setting stand­
ards be flexible?
D. Does the auditor-of-record concept suggest any particular prob­
lems from a cost-benefit viewpoint?
II-1c. Reporting on Other Activities and Characteristics. Some 
matters relevant to the evaluation of an entity are frequently not 
presented in the form of information that can be issued to interested 
parties. For the most part, these activities or characteristics relate to 
the qualitative aspects of an entity, such as characteristics of its man­
agement, its information system, or its operations. T o a great ex­
tent, no generally accepted standards of objective measurement exist 
for those qualities. Reporting on them might, therefore, be confined 
to identifying problems or deficiencies and making recommenda­
tions for improvement.
A. W hat nontraditional aspects of an entity should independent 
auditors become involved in reporting on? Should auditors re­
port on
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1. Characteristics of management, such as competence or in­
tegrity?
2. Economy or efficiency of operations?
3. Effectiveness of various programs or activities?
4. Compliance with laws and regulations that do not directly 
affect financial statements?
5. Adequacy of a company’s information system for manage­
ment decision-making?
6. Adequacy of a company’s internal control system?
B. Who should receive the reports?
1. Only those in a position to have the ability and authority 
to initiate the changes recommended (management, board 
of directors, or regulatory agency, depending on the circum­
stances) ?
2. Parties to whom management or the board of directors 
agree to make the report available?
3. Interested parties that request the report from the com­
pany, such as investors, potential investors, suppliers, cus­
tomers, or employees?
C. Should the various types of reports that would be made avail­
able to any interested parties
1. Include only those deficiencies or weaknesses not corrected 
prior to issuance?
2. Appear in the company’s annual report?
D. Which types of reports should be optional in the sense that a 
company may request them if management or the board of di­
rectors desires, and which should become a normal part of an 
annual audit?
II-2. Evaluating the Relationship of Nonauditing Services to 
the Audit Function
This issue is concerned with the relationship of nonauditing services, 
such as management advisory services and tax practice, to the audit 
function and the possible need for restriction or expansion of those 
services.
Questions have often been raised about the appropriate rela­
tionship between the audit function and other services that CPA 
firms perform for audit clients. Im portant considerations are the in­
fluence of recent developments on acceptance of past practices and
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the effect on the auditor’s role if services were significantly expanded 
or reduced.
A. To what extent does the evidence suggest that failures in audit 
performance have resulted from performance of consulting 
services for audit clients?
B. Is it feasible to establish relatively objective criteria for identi­
fying the types of activities and services that CPA firms should 
be permitted to provide audit clients? Is the degree or type of 
association with a client’s interests inherent in a particular ser­
vice a more important factor than the general relationship be­
tween a CPA firm and its client? (For example, would per­
forming an advocacy role in tax matters or involvement in de­
cision-making in management services seriously affect inde­
pendence?)
C. Should any proposed extension of the independent auditor’s 
role be limited on the grounds that it conflicts with the basic 
audit function?
D. W hat changes might be made in the organization or practice 
of CPA firms to reduce a possible problem of a conflict between 
nonauditing services and the audit function?
1. Should functions be segregated within CPA firms?
2. Should total fees or components of fees paid to CPA firms 
be disclosed?
3. Should steps be taken to increase the knowledge of users of 
the audit function concerning nonauditing services?
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Phase III: 
The Institutional 
Framework of the
Audit Function
Phase III is concerned with the various institutions in society that 
govern how independent auditors are educated, licensed, regulated, 
and disciplined. The primary focus will be a consideration of 
changes in the institutional framework that may be necessary to al­
low independent auditors to fulfill their present responsibilities ade­
quately or to accept new responsibilities. The following issues are 
of primary concern in this phase of the study.
Organizational structure for regulating the profession 
Policies and procedures for maintaining the quality of audit 
practice
Process of establishing auditing standards 
Developing individuals as independent auditors 
Relationships between the auditor and parties interested in the 
audit function 
Legal environment of independent auditors
The conclusions and recommendations formulated in the first two 
phases of the study may have to be modified if the necessary or de­
sirable changes in the institutional framework cannot be achieved.
III-1. Organizational Structure for Regulating the Profession
This issue is concerned with the effectiveness of the present organi­
zational structure of the auditing profession for regulating the prac­
tice of auditing and possibilities for improving that structure.
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Questions have been raised concerning possible changes in the 
structure of the auditing profession and the relationships between 
the organizations and institutions involved in training, licensing, 
regulating, and disciplining independent auditors. How should the 
auditing profession be organized and how should it relate to other 
institutions in society to meet effectively the needs and expectations 
of society?
Under the present organizational structure for regulating the 
practice of independent auditors, fifty-four separate jurisdictions li­
cense and regulate individual CPAs. Virtually all professional organ­
izations of CPAs have memberships composed of individuals, and 
their regulations relate primarily to their members. Practice, how­
ever, is significantly influenced by regional, national, and interna­
tional CPA firms.
A. T o what extent should changes be made in the process of licen­
sing independent auditors? (Licensing in this context includes 
other related processes, such as the possibility of accreditation 
or registration.)
1. Should practitioners be licensed on some national basis? 
(For example, should practitioners who engage in interstate 
commerce be licensed on a federal basis rather than a state 
basis?)
2. W ould national licensing be a substitute for or an addition 
to the licensing by state agencies?
3. Should national licensing be for individuals and firms?
B. Should any changes be made in the licensing process to give 
recognition to differences in the types of services or functions 
performed?
1. Should a distinction be made on the basis of the degree of 
public interest in an independent auditor’s work? (For ex­
ample, should a distinction be based on whether an audi­
tor’s work is involved primarily with companies whose 
shares are publicly traded?)
2. Should a distinction be made on the basis of specialization, 
such as by industry or by skills such as computer auditing 
or taxation?
C. Should changes in licensing include establishment of a body 
to regulate those firms whose practice is primarily auditing com­
panies with publicly traded securities?
(Regulating auditing practice by firms rather than by individuals 
would be a fundamental change in the institutional framework.
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Considering the possibility of that type of change raises the follow­
ing additional questions.)
D. W hat disciplinary authority and what privileges would a body 
charged with regulating firms need to be effective?
1. W hat privileges would be needed by the body? (For ex­
ample, should the body have subpoena power, investigatory 
confidentiality, or immunity from civil litigation?
2. W hat relationship should the body have to existing bodies 
concerned with disciplinary matters such as state boards of 
accountancy?
3. W hat rights might be provided for appeal from disciplinary 
decisions of the body?
E. W hat role might the federal government have in the operations 
of the body? (For example, the role could be supportive, such 
as the relationship between the SEC and the FASB; supervis­
ory, such as the relationship between the National Association 
of Securities Dealers and the SEC; or directly regulatory.) 
W hat federal agency should be involved? An existing agency 
such as the SEC or the GAO, or a new agency?
F. If a national body were established to regulate the work of 
firms, should that body be a part of the AICPA or should it 
be a new, independent body?
(Several matters that relate to the regulation of practice are consid­
ered as separate issues, bu t the following questions on certain aspects 
of those issues that relate to the establishment of a national body 
to regulate firms are raised in this section.)
G. If a national body were established to regulate firms, should its 
functions include:
1. Supervision of quality review programs and public disclo­
sure of information bearing on the public’s confidence in 
firms?
2. Establishing professional standards?
3. Establishing standards and administering a program for 
qualification to practice?
4. Assuring protection to the public against losses from faulty 
financial reporting? (For example, a federal government in­
surance program might be established.)
III-2. Policies and Procedures for Maintaining the Quality 
of Audit Practice
This issue is concerned with the effectiveness of present policies and 
procedures for maintaining the quality of audit practice and the de-
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sirability of increasing information available to the public concern­
ing a firm’s quality review practices and other information that 
might bear on public confidence.
The performance of firms of independent auditors depends in 
part on the quality control procedures of those firms. The confi­
dence of the public in specific firms may be affected by public in­
formation on quality control review programs and other relevant 
aspects of a firm’s operations.
A. W hat are the basic elements that assure quality of performance 
by individuals and firms? Is there evidence that quality control 
programs are effective? T o what extent should reliance be 
placed on individuals who have been made highly conscious of 
their responsibilities versus reliance on formal quality control 
programs?
B. T o what extent do failures in audit performance indicate weak­
nesses in quality control programs?
C. Should an independent review of a firm’s quality controls by 
an outside group be voluntary or mandatory?
D. W hat group should supervise and conduct independent reviews 
of quality control programs?
E. Should a firm that has had an independent quality control re­
view be permitted (or required) to disclose the results of that 
review to various parties?
F. Should firms establish independent public review boards com­
posed of knowledgeable individuals not involved in the prac­
tice of auditing to review the organizational structure and oper­
ating procedures of firms? (For example, a large public ac­
counting firm has appointed such a board.)
G. To what extent and in what form should firms of independent 
auditors disclose their financial resources, operating results, and 
other relevant information?
III-3. Process of Establishing Auditing Standards
This issue is concerned with possible ways of making the present 
process for establishing auditing standards more effective or efficient.
The members of the AICPA in 1948 and 1949 adopted ten for­
mal standards for the guidance of auditors in the conduct of an 
audit. The series of Statements on Auditing Standards issued by the 
AICPA’s auditing standards division are interpretations of the stand­
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ards and provide more detailed guidance. Statements on Auditing 
Standards are issued by the auditing standards executive committee 
of the AICPA’s auditing standards division, which is composed of 
twenty-one members who serve on a voluntary basis.
Possible ways of changing the process of establishing auditing 
standards and the relative advantages and disadvantages of those 
changes need to be evaluated.
A. W hat body should have primary responsibility for establishing 
auditing standards? W hat would be the advantages and dis­
advantages of the body being
1. The AICPA (the auditing standards division or a similar 
body) ?
2. An autonomous nongovernmental body (such a body might 
be a national body that regulates CPA firms) ?
3. A governmental body (such as the SEC or GAO or a new 
body) ?
B. W hat should be the composition and structure of the body 
charged with establishing auditing standards?
1. W hat is the optimum size for the body?
2. Should the chairman, or the chairman and some or all mem­
bers serve on a full-time, paid basis?
3. W hat backgrounds and skills should members of the body 
have?
a. How many should be CPAs?
b. How many should be practicing auditors?
c. Should any interest groups other than practicing auditors 
be represented?
4. W hat is the most desirable relationship between the extent 
and quality of the staff assistance provided for the activity 
and the composition and required commitment of the mem­
bers of the body?
C. W hat methods of operation should the body use to assure 
timely and effective pronouncements?
1. Are present procedures for the exposure of a pronounce­
ment prior to issuance satisfactory?
2. Should public hearings be held prior to the issuance of 
some or all types of pronouncements?
3. Should an advisory committee be appointed to assist in 
establishing priorities and to represent additional interest 
groups? If so, what should be the size and composition of 
an advisory committee?
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4. By what vote of its membership should the body act? Ma­
jority? Two-thirds? Other?
5. Is the present procedure for issuing unofficial auditing in­
terpretations satisfactory? (Interpretations are now prepared 
by the auditing standards division staff and reviewed by 
the executive committee.) If not, how should the process 
be changed?
D. W hat type of research is necessary as a prelude to establishing 
auditing standards?
1. Who should conduct it?
2. How should it be financed?
HI-4. Developing Individuals as Independent Auditors
This issue is concerned with the effectiveness of the present process 
for establishing and administering procedures for recognizing indi­
viduals as qualified to practice as independent auditors, including 
education, and possibilities for improving that process.
Questions on qualifications for individuals to practice are closely 
related to those concerning regulation of practice. In fact, they refer 
to complementary approaches to controlling the quality of a pro­
fession.
A. Do past failures in audit performance indicate deficiencies in the 
professional qualification requirements for auditors?
1. To what extent can the failures be attributed to deficien­
cies in
a. Technical knowledge and understanding of accounting 
theory, principles, and practices?
b. Technical knowledge and understanding of auditing 
theory, standards, and practices?
c. Knowledge and understanding of nontechnical matters?
d. Professional attitude?
2. Is the present division of responsibility for the education of 
auditors appropriate? To what extent should auditors be 
expected to receive their education in
a. Colleges and universities before entry into the profes­
sion?
b. CPA firms at the time the auditor enters the profession?
c. Continuing professional development programs of firms 
or professional organizations or through continuing in­
dividual efforts?
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3. T o what extent can deficiencies in performance be attrib­
uted to each of the three areas of education?
4. Are current requirements for professional licensing adequate 
and appropriate?
B. W hat changes may be appropriate in the process of educating, 
training, and licensing of individual auditors?
1. Should professional schools of accounting be established?
2. Should continuing education after licensing be mandatory?
3. Can the Uniform CPA Examination be changed to test bet­
ter the skills and knowledge required of independent audi­
tors?
C. W hat effect would extension of the independent auditor’s role 
have on the future manpower needs of the profession and what 
steps should be taken to meet those needs?
III-5. Relationships Between the Auditor and Parties 
Interested in the Audit Function
This issue is concerned with the relationship of the independent 
auditor to investors, creditors, the board of directors and its audit 
committee, management, and other interested parties, and the na­
ture and extent of the auditor's responsibilities to those various 
parties.
The auditor’s work affects many parties and the auditor has 
responsibilities, which vary in extent and nature, to a variety of 
interests.
A. T o  what extent are basic changes in the relationship between
the auditor and the management of the audited company nec­
essary or desirable?
1. Should changes be considered that would tend to produce 
more of an adversary relationship between management and 
the auditor?
2. How should potential conflicts between the auditor’s re­
sponsibility for public disclosure and his obligation to the 
company for confidentiality be resolved?
B. To what extent are changes in the methods of appointing or 
compensating auditors desirable?
1. Should formal appointment or replacement be placed more 
directly in the hands of stockholders or their representa­
tives?
35
2. Should companies rotate auditors on some systematic basis, 
such as appointing a new auditor every five years?
3. Is it desirable and feasible to establish some new means of 
compensating auditors so that fees are not paid directly 
by the audited company?
4. Should audit fees be disclosed?
C. T o what extent are modifications desirable in the process by 
which a company changes auditors?
1. Should the reasons for a change be communicated to stock­
holders and other interested parties beyond current Form 
8-K requirements?
2. W ould making a change in auditors more difficult be de­
sirable?
D. Should companies be required to establish audit committees?
1. Should any particular form of operations be suggested for 
audit committees? For example, should they
a. Have an independent staff?
b. Be required to report at annual meetings?
2. Should regular meetings with audit committees or full 
boards of directors be required of auditors?
E. T o  what extent are changes in the nature and extent of com­
munications between independent auditors and stockholders 
or other interested parties necessary or desirable?
1. Should auditors be given the right, or be required, to at­
tend annual meetings to answer questions?
2. W hen should auditors have the right to communicate di­
rectly with interested parties, such as stockholders, creditors, 
or others?
F. W hat should be the methods of implementing proposed 
changes in relationships?
III-6 . The L egal E nvironm ent of In d epend en t Auditors
This issue is concerned with the effect of the present process for 
litigating claims against auditors and the desirability and possibility 
of changes in that process.
The courts are the ultimate forum for the resolution of dis­
putes about the adequacy of an auditor’s performance, but they may 
not necessarily be the most efficient forum. W hen expectation levels 
of the public exceed those of independent auditors, the courts often
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resolve the conflict. T hat process can be costly both for those in­
volved and for society.
A. To what extent does recent and current litigation indicate that 
public expectations exceed the responsibilities that auditors can 
reasonably be expected to fulfill?
B. To what extent has the present process of adjudicating charges 
against independent auditors produced desirable social conse­
quences?
C. Has the present process for adjudicating charges against inde­
pendent auditors produced undesirable social consequences?
1. Has the apparent extent of exposure to legal liability
a. Reduced the willingness of independent auditors to ac­
cept additional responsibilities in connection with the 
audit of annual financial statements or to extend their 
functions?
b. Reduced the quantity or quality of personnel entering 
or continuing in the profession?
2. Is the possibility that auditors will not accept clients in fi­
nancial difficulty or clients engaging in new and untried 
ventures a significant problem?
D. Several factors appear to have contributed significantly to the 
recent increase in litigation against independent auditors. As a 
matter of public policy, should the profession attempt to 
change any of the following factors:
1. The contingent fee system for plaintiffs’ attorneys?
2. Federal rules relating to class actions in securities litigation?
3. The burden of proof to demonstrate lack of culpability 
placed on defendants by Section 11 of the Securities Act 
of 1933?
4. The applicability of SEC Rule 10b-5 to routine audits not 
made for offerings of securities and flexible standards in 
finding liability?
5. The broadening scope of common-law liability to third 
parties for negligence?
E. To what extent might changes be made to reduce the possibil­
ity of litigation not involving substandard performance, with­
out unduly restricting the rights of damaged plaintiffs?
1. Should efforts be made to have a limitation placed on the 
amount of monetary damages for which a CPA can be held 
liable?
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2. Should courts be urged to refer technical questions involv­
ing compliance with professional standards to a special ad­
visor to the court (a master) ?
3. Should the courts be urged to recognize adherence to pro­
fessional standards as an adequate defense for independent 
auditors? What consideration should be given to varying the 
conclusiveness of this defense for criminal versus civil liti­
gation?
If changes were made in the process of determining the legal 
liability of independent auditors, would some form of federal 
insurance for investors be desirable?
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APPENDIX
Charge to the Commission 
on Auditors’ 
Responsibilities
Issued by the Board of Directors of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
A Study of the Responsibilities of Independent Auditors
In the broadest sense, the function of independent auditors is to en­
hance the reliability of information used in financial decisions of a wide 
range of individuals and organizations. This role is an important aspect of 
the process of efficient allocation of resources in the economy. Therefore, it 
is vital to the economy that users of information have confidence in auditors. 
Such confidence is dependent on a mutual understanding as to the appro­
priate responsibilities of auditors and a belief by users that such responsi­
bilities are being fulfilled.
In view of the growing demands by investors, creditors, management, 
government, and the general public for auditors to assume a wider scope of 
responsibility, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has 
concluded that a full-scale study should be made of the future function of 
independent auditors.
The main purpose of the study is to develop conclusions and recom­
mendations regarding the appropriate responsibilities of independent audi­
tors. It should consider whether a gap may exist between what the public 
expects or needs and what auditors can and should reasonably expect to 
accomplish. If such a gap does exist, it needs to be explored to determine 
how the disparity can be resolved.
Some of the specific questions being asked by the public are, What responsibility should an auditor have for detecting fraud? Should auditors 
monitor all financial information released to the public and if so, what 
should be the extent of their responsibilities? Should the auditor’s standard report, particularly the phrase “present fairly,” be changed to express better 
the responsibilities of auditors? What mechanisms should be adopted to strengthen the function of auditors? Is the mechanism for developing audit­
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ing standards adequate? What should the profession do to reduce the risks 
of misunderstanding about its role?
In considering such questions, the study should recognize that the re­
sponsibilities of auditors may be constrained by the nature of the informa­
tion presented, the evidence that exists to support that information, the 
effectiveness of the methods of acquiring that evidence, and the costs of 
collecting and analyzing the information. In developing the feasible respon­
sibilities of auditors, responsibilities should not be confused with results. 
Recognizing a responsibility does not necessarily imply infallibility in exe­
cution.
The study should obtain the views of as many interested and knowledge­
able parties as is possible and should assure that the views obtained are 
representative of users and providers of independent audits as well as pro­
viders of financial information. One or more public hearings should be 
held. A public record should be maintained of significant proceedings of 
the study and of comments received.
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